THREAT BRIEFING · 18.11.2026 DEENFRES

Strategy & Governance

Cyber Warfare 2026: States Build Digital Capabilities

By Tobias Massow · February 28, 2026 · 5 min read

State cyber operations can aim to gather intelligence, sabotage systems or prepare for future attacks. Documented cases concern Ukraine’s power grid and critical infrastructure in the US. European businesses also need to assess the consequences of an attack on their own systems or those of their service providers. Secure access, early detection and tested continuity arrangements are essential.

Key takeaways

  • State actors pursue strategic objectives. These include gathering information and preparing for potential disruption.
  • Critical infrastructure is a documented target. Authorities have described access to companies in sectors including energy, communications and water.
  • Protection starts with the most important business functions. Businesses should secure access, detect suspicious activity and practise recovery.

The objectives of state cyber operations

State-sponsored groups can gather information about technology, organisations and political decisions. Other operations aim to disrupt systems or prepare access for a future conflict. The term cyber warfare is often used for such activities. Whether an individual operation legally qualifies as part of an armed conflict depends on the circumstances.

The boundaries with cybercrime are not always clear. Financially motivated groups can also target critical infrastructure. Defence therefore depends on identifying the access points and operational processes at risk as well as considering who is suspected of being behind an attack.

Sandworm and Volt Typhoon: two documented cases

The US Department of Justice identifies the group known as Sandworm as part of Unit 74455 of Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU. In an indictment, it accuses members of the unit of destructive attacks on Ukraine’s power grid in 2015 and 2016, among other actions.

The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and its partners describe Volt Typhoon as a Chinese state-sponsored group. They document access to IT networks of critical infrastructure organisations in the US, including companies in the communications, energy, transport and water sectors. The authorities assess the activity as preparation for potential disruption during a major crisis or conflict.

Attacks on essential services have also been documented in Europe: the Council of the EU cites an attack by a pro-Russian group on a Danish water utility in December 2024.

What this means for businesses and supply chains

An attack can compromise data, disable systems or interrupt the provision of IT services. Businesses should therefore also identify their dependencies on network operators, cloud services and other suppliers. For operators of industrial facilities, this includes examining the connections between office IT and operational technology and identifying which functions must continue during an outage.

A business does not have to be a direct target of a state group to feel the effects. If a required service fails or a business partner is compromised, its own operations can be disrupted.

Preparing protection and recovery

  1. Reduce the attack surface: Identify internet-facing systems and address critical vulnerabilities promptly.
  2. Secure access: Use phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication wherever possible for important accounts and remote access. Limit permissions to what is necessary.
  3. Detect activity: Analyse security and access logs centrally. The principle of “assume breach” helps with planning: protective measures are designed to detect and contain access that has already been gained.
  4. Separate IT and operational technology: Identify, restrict and monitor connections to control networks. Assess changes to industrial facilities for their operational impact.
  5. Test continuity arrangements: Practise restoring from backups, assign responsibilities and run through how critical processes would work if a service provider failed.

Alerts from authorities and sector-specific organisations help businesses adapt their measures to current attack patterns. Each organisation must assess which additional statutory security and reporting obligations apply to its circumstances.

Frequently asked questions

Each question is closed. Tap to reveal the answer.

What distinguishes state cyber operations from cybercrime?

State operations can pursue political, military or intelligence objectives. Cybercriminals are often financially motivated. Methods and actors involved can overlap.

Are smaller businesses affected too?

Smaller businesses should also assess their dependencies and access points. An attack on a service provider or business partner can disrupt their own operations.

Which measures take priority?

Priorities include protecting critical access points, addressing serious vulnerabilities, detecting suspicious activity and testing recovery. The order depends on the risks and operational dependencies.

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Translated from the German original using artificial intelligence. The German version is authoritative.

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