{"id":7697,"date":"2026-03-08T09:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-03-08T09:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.securitytoday.de\/2026\/04\/02\/post_id-5525\/"},"modified":"2026-05-10T19:04:08","modified_gmt":"2026-05-10T19:04:08","slug":"post-quantum-cryptography-germany-prepares","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.securitytoday.de\/en\/2026\/03\/08\/post-quantum-cryptography-germany-prepares\/","title":{"rendered":"Post-Quantum Cryptography: Germany Prepares"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"display:inline-block;background:#69d8ed;color:#fff;padding:4px 14px;border-radius:20px;font-size:0.85em\">8 min Reading Time<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\"><strong>In August 2024, NIST published the first three finalized post-quantum cryptography standards. In November 2024, the BSI (Federal Office for Information Security) and 17 other European authorities called on industry and government to begin migration in earnest. And the Bundeswehr has already secured its 13,000-kilometer fiber-optic network with quantum-resistant algorithms. Germany is preparing  &#8211;  but the private sector is lagging behind. Not a single major German technology company has rolled out post-quantum cryptography in production.<\/strong><\/p>\n<h2 style=\"margin-top:64px;margin-bottom:20px;padding-top:16px;\">TL;DR<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>NIST standards finalized:<\/strong> ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) have been binding since August 2024  &#8211;  the foundation for global PQC migration<\/li>\n<li><strong>BSI recommendation:<\/strong> Migrate the most sensitive systems by the end of 2030, hybrid approach as a transitional solution, crypto-agility as a design principle<\/li>\n<li><strong>Harvest Now, Decrypt Later:<\/strong> State actors are collecting encrypted data today to decrypt it with future quantum computers  &#8211;  all major security agencies confirm the threat<\/li>\n<li><strong>Bundeswehr as a pioneer:<\/strong> 13,000 kilometers of fiber-optic network secured with quantum-resistant algorithms<\/li>\n<li><strong>Migration costs:<\/strong> The U.S. government estimates $7.1 billion for federal agencies alone by 2035<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2 style=\"margin-top:64px;margin-bottom:20px;padding-top:16px;\">Why the Threat Is Real Today  &#8211;  Not Tomorrow<\/h2>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">The most common misconception about quantum computers and cryptography is: <em>&#8220;We still have time.&#8221;<\/em> Technically, that\u2019s true  &#8211;  cryptographically relevant quantum computers don\u2019t exist today. IBM plans a system with around 200 logical qubits for 2028\/2029, and Google is targeting similar scales. Breaking RSA-2048 would require several million logical qubits. The BSI estimates a timeline of possibly 16 years, potentially sooner.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">But the threat isn\u2019t the day a quantum computer breaks RSA. The threat is <em>today<\/em>. The strategy is called <em>&#8220;Harvest Now, Decrypt Later&#8221;<\/em> (HNDL): State actors are collecting encrypted communications and data traffic today, storing them, and waiting to decrypt them with future quantum computers. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the UK\u2019s NCSC, ENISA, and Australia\u2019s ASD all confirm this threat in their official PQC recommendations. In April 2024, the European Commission explicitly warned that data requiring long-term confidentiality is already exposed to HNDL risks.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">For companies with sensitive long-term data  &#8211;  patents, health records, state secrets, financial contracts  &#8211;  this means: Every day without quantum-resistant encryption is a day when that data could be intercepted and stored for future decryption. The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.securitytoday.de\/en\/2026\/02\/26\/post_id-5519\/\">supply chain security<\/a> requirements of NIS2 add further pressure.<\/p>\n<div style=\"background:#0a1628;border-radius:12px;padding:32px;margin:40px 0;\">\n<div style=\"display:flex;justify-content:space-around;text-align:center;flex-wrap:wrap;gap:20px;\">\n<div style=\"flex:1;min-width:140px;\">\n<div style=\"font-size:2.2em;font-weight:800;color:#69d8ed;\">3 Standards<\/div>\n<div style=\"color:#69d8ed;font-size:0.85em;margin-top:4px;\">NIST FIPS 203\/204\/205 finalisiert<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div style=\"flex:1;min-width:140px;\">\n<div style=\"font-size:2.2em;font-weight:800;color:#69d8ed;\">13.000 km<\/div>\n<div style=\"color:#69d8ed;font-size:0.85em;margin-top:4px;\">Bundeswehr-Glasfaser quantensicher<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div style=\"flex:1;min-width:140px;\">\n<div style=\"font-size:2.2em;font-weight:800;color:#69d8ed;\">$7,1 Mrd.<\/div>\n<div style=\"color:#69d8ed;font-size:0.85em;margin-top:4px;\">US-Migrationskosten bis 2035<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p style=\"color:rgba(0,0,0,0.5);font-size:0.8em;text-align:right;margin-top:-30px;margin-bottom:30px;\">Sources: NIST FIPS August 2024, DGAP Policy Brief 2024, White House PQC Report July 2024<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"margin-top:64px;margin-bottom:20px;padding-top:16px;\">The New Standards: What ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA Mean<\/h2>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">On August 13 and 14, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nist.gov\/news-events\/news\/2024\/08\/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards\">NIST published the first three post-quantum cryptography standards<\/a> as Federal Information Processing Standards. They took effect immediately, defining the algorithmic foundation for global migration.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\"><strong>FIPS 203 (ML-KEM)<\/strong> is based on CRYSTALS-Kyber and is the new standard for key encapsulation  &#8211;  the secure exchange of keys. Every time two systems establish an encrypted channel (TLS, VPN, messaging), such a mechanism is required. ML-KEM will eventually replace RSA and Diffie-Hellman in this area.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\"><strong>FIPS 204 (ML-DSA)<\/strong> is based on CRYSTALS-Dilithium and is the primary standard for digital signatures. Firmware updates, software certificates, email signatures, and blockchain transactions  &#8211;  wherever RSA or ECDSA are used today, ML-DSA will serve as the quantum-resistant alternative.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\"><strong>FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA)<\/strong> is based on SPHINCS+ and is a hash-based signature algorithm. It serves as a backup option in case ML-DSA shows vulnerabilities  &#8211;  a deliberate redundancy concept. A fourth standard (FN-DSA, based on FALCON) is in development.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">For companies, the three standards mean: The technical foundation is in place. The question is no longer <em>&#8220;Which algorithm do we use?&#8221;<\/em> but <em>&#8220;When do we start?&#8221;<\/em> And the BSI\u2019s answer is clear: now.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"margin-top:64px;margin-bottom:20px;padding-top:16px;\">BSI: Hybrid Approach and Crypto-Agility as Strategy<\/h2>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">The BSI has expanded its Technical Guideline TR-02102-1 (<em>Cryptographic Methods: Recommendations and Key Lengths<\/em>) in version 2026-01 to fully incorporate the NIST PQC standards. Recommended methods for key encapsulation: ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, and Classic McEliece. For digital signatures: ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, LMS\/HSS, and XMSS.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">Two concepts are central to the BSI\u2019s strategy. First, the <strong>hybrid approach<\/strong>: Until PQC is fully established, the BSI recommends combining a classical and a quantum-resistant method. The advantage: Communication remains secure as long as at least one of the two methods is secure. The technical implementation follows the ETSI specification TS 103 744 (<em>&#8220;Cat-then-KDF&#8221;<\/em>).<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">Second, <strong>crypto-agility<\/strong>: Systems must be designed so that algorithm changes are possible without a complete redesign. This may sound obvious, but it isn\u2019t. Many existing systems have cryptographic algorithms so deeply embedded in their architecture that a change would require a rebuild. The BSI therefore recommends anchoring crypto-agility as a design principle in every new system and update  &#8211;  a requirement that the Cyber Resilience Act will make mandatory from 2027.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">In November 2024, the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bsi.bund.de\/SharedDocs\/Downloads\/EN\/BSI\/Crypto\/PQC-joint-statement-2025.pdf\">BSI, together with 17 European partner authorities<\/a>, issued a statement calling on industry, critical infrastructure operators, and public administration to actively begin the PQC transition. For the most sensitive applications, the BSI recommends migration by the end of 2030. NIST sets the target for broad deployment at 2035.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"margin-top:64px;margin-bottom:20px;padding-top:16px;\">Germany\u2019s Research Lead: CISPA, HGI, Fraunhofer<\/h2>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">In PQC research, Germany is among the global leaders. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aisec.fraunhofer.de\/en\/spotlights\/Competence-Center-PQC.html\">Fraunhofer AISEC<\/a> operates a Competence Center for Post-Quantum Cryptography with around 100 PQC experts from government agencies, companies, universities, and research institutes. At the PQC Update 2024 conference in May, Fraunhofer delivered the core message: <em>&#8220;Migrate now to be secure later.&#8221;<\/em> The institute is working on concrete implementations  &#8211;  from the Impeccable-Keccak approach to securing SPHINCS+ to the KBLS project (long-lived quantum-resistant crypto libraries) and the Aquorypt project for PQC on resource-constrained systems like smart cards and industrial controls.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">The Horst G\u00f6rtz Institute (HGI) at Ruhr University Bochum played a direct role in developing the algorithms now included in the NIST standards. CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium  &#8211;  the foundation of ML-KEM and ML-DSA  &#8211;  were developed with significant contributions from HGI researchers. The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.securitytoday.de\/en\/2026\/02\/19\/post_id-5517\/\">CISPA in Saarbr\u00fccken<\/a>, the world\u2019s top-ranked institution in computer security, is working on the next generation of post-quantum-secure protocols. And the SFB CROSSING at TU Darmstadt has been researching cryptographic solutions for the post-quantum era since 2014.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">Germany, then, has the research expertise. The problem lies in the transfer.<\/p>\n<div style=\"background:linear-gradient(135deg,#f0f9fc 0%,#e0f3f8 100%);border-left:4px solid #69d8ed;border-radius:8px;padding:24px 28px;margin:40px 0;\">\n<p style=\"font-size:1.1em;font-style:italic;line-height:1.6;color:#0a1628;margin:0;\">The Bundeswehr has secured its 13,000-kilometer fiber-optic network with quantum-resistant algorithms  &#8211;  one of the few concrete PQC deployments worldwide. Not a single major German technology company has achieved anything comparable in production.<\/p>\n<p style=\"font-size:0.85em;color:#666;margin:8px 0 0 0;\">DGAP Policy Brief 2024<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<h2 style=\"margin-top:64px;margin-bottom:20px;padding-top:16px;\">Public Sector Ahead, Private Sector Behind<\/h2>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">The <a href=\"https:\/\/dgap.org\/en\/research\/publications\/how-germany-can-improve-its-standing-post-quantum-cryptography\">German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)<\/a> published a sobering assessment in 2024. The finding: Germany\u2019s public sector is on par with leading nations in PQC. The private sector lags significantly behind U.S. corporations.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">The Bundeswehr has secured its 13,000-kilometer fiber-optic network with quantum-resistant algorithms  &#8211;  a concrete deployment that makes Germany a global leader in government PQC implementation. The BSI was the first European authority to develop comprehensive PQC guidelines. And close alignment with NIST standards ensures NATO\/EU interoperability.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">The private sector, however: SAP has conducted proof-of-concept tests but has not deployed PQC in production systems. Siemens confirms PQC activities without disclosing deployment details. Deutsche Telekom is working on research projects for quantum-secure networks (DemoQuanDT, QSNP, EuroQCI), but commercial rollout remains unconfirmed. The DGAP\u2019s finding is clear: Not a single major German technology company has rolled out PQC in production  &#8211;  while Amazon (AWS), IBM, and Apple in the U.S. are already actively implementing it.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">Particularly critical: German email providers offer no quantum-resistant solutions. Remote-access software (the worst-performing category, according to DGAP) has no providers with PQC announcements. Even BWMessenger and BundesMessenger  &#8211;  the official messaging services of the Bundeswehr and federal administration  &#8211;  remain without quantum protection.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"margin-top:64px;margin-bottom:20px;padding-top:16px;\">CRA and NIS2: Regulation as a Migration Driver<\/h2>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">The Cyber Resilience Act (in force since December 2024) will make PQC effectively mandatory from 2027. Products must be designed with crypto-agility and must be able to sign firmware updates with quantum-resistant algorithms. The CRA requires <em>&#8220;state-of-the-art&#8221;<\/em> encryption  &#8211;  and once NIST standards exist and the BSI recommends them, PQC becomes part of the state of the art.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">In April 2024, the European Commission published a coordinated implementation roadmap (C(2024) 2393) with milestones for 2026, 2030, and 2035. A final coordinated EU roadmap was planned for June 2025. NIS2 adds further pressure: The requirement for <em>&#8220;state-of-the-art&#8221;<\/em> security measures extends to the cryptography used. For the more than 30,000 NIS2-regulated companies in Germany, PQC readiness thus becomes a compliance requirement, not a voluntary measure.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">The regulatory cascade is clear: Companies selling products on the EU market from 2027 must support crypto-agility and quantum-resistant firmware updates (CRA). Those subject to NIS2 must use state-of-the-art cryptography  &#8211;  and that includes PQC once the standards are established. The BSI has already incorporated these standards into its recommendations. For CISOs and CTOs, this means: PQC migration isn\u2019t <em>someday<\/em>. It\u2019s the next regulatory compliance sprint after the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.securitytoday.de\/en\/2026\/01\/05\/nis2-standortvorteil-cybersecurity-regulierung-deutschland-reboot-2026\/\">NIS2 implementation<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"margin-top:64px;margin-bottom:20px;padding-top:16px;\">What Migration Costs  &#8211;  and How Long It Takes<\/h2>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">The U.S. government estimates the cost of PQC migration for federal agencies alone at around $7.1 billion for the period from 2025 to 2035. For companies, estimates vary widely: Small organizations need 5 to 7 years, medium-sized ones 8 to 12 years, and large enterprises 12 to 15 years or more.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">Costs arise in four phases. First: the cryptographic inventory  &#8211;  a complete record of all encryption methods in use. This is the most labor-intensive step, as many organizations don\u2019t know where cryptography is deployed. Second: software updates and new libraries. Third: hardware replacement for systems that don\u2019t support PQC via updates. Fourth: testing to ensure hybrid and new methods work correctly across all systems.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">Companies aiming to migrate by 2030 (the BSI\u2019s recommendation for the most sensitive systems) must start now. The cryptographic inventory alone can take six to twelve months for a large enterprise. After that, the actual migration begins  &#8211;  and it takes time because every system must be tested and validated.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"margin-top:64px;margin-bottom:20px;padding-top:16px;\">Germany vs. USA vs. China: Three Strategies<\/h2>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">The three leading PQC nations are pursuing different strategies. The U.S. relies on the private sector as the driver: Amazon, IBM, and Apple are already actively implementing PQC. National Security Memorandum NSM-10 mandates migration for national security systems. In Germany, the public sector leads: BSI, Bundeswehr, and government agencies are pioneers, while the private sector lags.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">China is developing its own PQC standards independently of NIST. This means algorithmic divergence: Chinese and Western systems will be incompatible in the post-quantum era. China is simultaneously seen as the leading HNDL threat to Western long-term data and invests significantly more in quantum research than most Western nations.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">For Germany, this means: The research expertise is there (HGI co-developed CRYSTALS-Kyber). The government infrastructure is in place (BSI standards, Bundeswehr deployment). What\u2019s missing is the transfer to the private sector. The 1,700 <a href=\"https:\/\/mybusinessfuture.com\/reboot-germany-735-milliarden-mittelstand-investitionen-2026\/\">hidden champions<\/a> in Germany\u2019s mid-sized sector haven\u2019t even put the issue on their radar.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"margin-top:64px;margin-bottom:20px;padding-top:16px;\">What Companies Must Do Now<\/h2>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\"><strong>1. Create a cryptographic inventory.<\/strong> Every company must know where and what encryption is used. This includes TLS connections, VPN tunnels, database encryption, email signatures, code signing, and all embedded cryptographic components in products.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\"><strong>2. Classify data by protection needs.<\/strong> Not all data carries the same HNDL risk. Patents, health records, and long-term contracts have a protection horizon of 10 to 30 years and require immediate migration. Marketing emails do not.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\"><strong>3. Introduce hybrid encryption.<\/strong> The BSI-recommended hybrid approach (classical plus PQC) is the safest migration path. It protects immediately against HNDL attacks and remains secure even if a PQC algorithm shows vulnerabilities.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\"><strong>4. Anchor crypto-agility as a design principle.<\/strong> Every new system and update must allow algorithm changes without redesign. The CRA will make this mandatory from 2027.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\"><strong>5. Leverage Fraunhofer expertise.<\/strong> The PQC Competence Center at Fraunhofer AISEC offers consulting, proof-of-concept projects, and concrete implementation support. For mid-sized companies, this is the most pragmatic entry point.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"margin-top:64px;margin-bottom:20px;padding-top:16px;\">Frequently Asked Questions<\/h2>\n<h3>What is post-quantum cryptography?<\/h3>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">Encryption methods that cannot be broken by quantum computers. Today\u2019s standard encryption (RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDSA) is theoretically vulnerable to quantum computers. The new NIST standards  &#8211;  ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA  &#8211;  are based on mathematical problems that even quantum computers cannot solve efficiently.<\/p>\n<h3>When will quantum computers be able to break current encryption?<\/h3>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">BSI-commissioned studies estimate possibly 16 years, potentially sooner. IBM plans a system with around 200 logical qubits for 2028\/2029, but breaking RSA-2048 would require millions of logical qubits. NIST recommends migration by 2030 for critical systems and broad deployment by 2035.<\/p>\n<h3>What does &#8220;Harvest Now, Decrypt Later&#8221; mean?<\/h3>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">State actors are collecting encrypted data today and storing it to decrypt it with future quantum computers. This particularly affects data requiring long-term confidentiality, such as patents, health records, or state secrets. All major Western security agencies confirm this threat.<\/p>\n<h3>What does the BSI recommend for PQC migration?<\/h3>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">A hybrid approach (classical plus quantum-resistant) as a transitional solution, crypto-agility as a design principle, and migration of the most sensitive systems by the end of 2030. In November 2024, the BSI and 17 European partner authorities jointly called for the active start of migration.<\/p>\n<h3>How far along is Germany in PQC implementation?<\/h3>\n<p style=\"line-height:1.8;margin-bottom:20px;\">The public sector is leading: The Bundeswehr has secured 13,000 kilometers of fiber-optic cable with quantum-resistant algorithms. The private sector is lagging: Not a single major German technology company has rolled out PQC in production. The research expertise (CISPA, HGI, Fraunhofer) is world-class, but the transfer to industry is missing.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"margin-top:64px;margin-bottom:20px;padding-top:16px;\">Further Reading<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.securitytoday.de\/en\/2026\/02\/19\/post_id-5517\/\">Cybersecurity Talent: Why Germany\u2019s Experts Are a Quiet Export Hit<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.securitytoday.de\/en\/2026\/02\/26\/post_id-5519\/\">Supply Chain Security: From Compliance Burden to Competitive Advantage<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/mybusinessfuture.com\/reboot-germany-735-milliarden-mittelstand-investitionen-2026\/\">Reboot Germany: 735 Billion Euros, Three Mid-Sized Companies, and the Question of Whether the Crisis Is Really That Bad<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"font-style:italic;text-align:right;margin-top:40px;\">Header Image Source: Pexels \/ Markus Spiske (px:1089438)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"In August 2024, NIST published the first three finalized post-quantum cryptography standards. In November 2024, the BSI (Federal Office for Information Security) and 17 other European authorities called on industry and government to begin migration in earnest. And the Bundeswehr has already secured its 13,000-kilometer fiber-optic network with quantum-resistant algorithms. Germany [&hellip;]","protected":false},"author":55,"featured_media":5524,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_yoast_wpseo_focuskw":"post-quantum cryptography","_yoast_wpseo_title":"Post-Quantum Cryptography: Germany Prepares","_yoast_wpseo_metadesc":"Post-quantum cryptography: Secure your data against future threats with Germany\u2019s latest standards. 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