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Quantum computers capable of breaking current public-key encryption do not yet exist in sufficient strength. But the “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” concept makes post-quantum security an urgent issue: Attackers are collecting encrypted data today to decrypt it once quantum computers are powerful enough. This is a real threat for long-lasting secrets.<\/strong><\/p>\n The argument for early action is not “Quantum computers are breaking your encryption today.” It is “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later”: Intelligence services and well-equipped attackers are collecting encrypted data traffic today, storing it, and waiting for the next generation of quantum computers.<\/p>\n For which data is this relevant? State secrets (obviously), but also: Medical data with long-term protection requirements, financial transactions with long-term archiving, business secrets with lasting competitive relevance, and digital signatures on documents that need to be valid for decades.<\/p>\n In August 2024, NIST published the first final post-quantum cryptography standards:<\/p>\n FIPS 203 (CRYSTALS-Kyber \/ ML-KEM):<\/strong> Key Encapsulation Mechanism – replaces RSA and Diffie-Hellman for secure key exchange.<\/p>\n FIPS 204 (CRYSTALS-Dilithium \/ ML-DSA):<\/strong> Digital signatures – replaces RSA signatures and ECDSA.<\/p>\n FIPS 205 (SPHINCS+ \/ SLH-DSA):<\/strong> Hash-based signature scheme as an alternative, particularly conservative and well-analyzed.<\/p>\n These standards are the basis for all migrations. TLS, VPNs, code signing, PKI certificates – all must be transitioned to these algorithms in the long term.<\/p>\n Create a cryptography inventory:<\/strong> Which cryptographic methods are used where? RSA key sizes, ECC curves, hash functions, protocols (TLS version, cipher suites). No migration without an inventory.<\/p>\n Plan crypto-agile architecture:<\/strong> Design systems so that algorithm exchange is possible without complete redevelopment. Algorithm abstraction in code, configurable cipher suites, modular PKI components.<\/p>\n Set priorities:<\/strong> Long-lasting secrets first. Data that will still be worth protecting in 2030 needs PQC protection today. Short-lived session keys are less urgent.<\/p>\n Consult suppliers:<\/strong> Which manufacturers offer PQC support in which products and when? Obtain roadmaps from VPN, PKI, HSM, and TLS stack manufacturers.<\/p>\n NIST PQC Standards finalized:<\/strong> August 2024 (FIPS 203, 204, 205)<\/p>\n Estimated CRQC timeframe:<\/strong> Earliest 2030-2035 (BSI, NIST, BIS)<\/p>\n Algorithms that will be broken:<\/strong> RSA, ECC, DH – all based on asymmetric cryptography<\/p>\n Secure post-quantum algorithms:<\/strong> CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, SPHINCS+ (NIST-finalized)<\/p>\n Estimated migration duration:<\/strong> 5-10 years for complete enterprise migration<\/p>\n Fact:<\/strong> In August 2024, NIST finalized the first post-quantum cryptography standards with FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) – companies should plan the migration now.<\/p>\n Fact:<\/strong> According to a Munich Re study, 61% of surveyed companies are not yet prepared for post-quantum cryptography, although they rate the risk as “high.”<\/p>\n Every question is locked. A tap unlocks the answer.<\/p>\n A quantum computer with sufficiently stable qubits (estimate: several million error-corrected logical qubits) to break RSA-2048 in a reasonable time. Today’s quantum computers have a few hundred to a thousand physical qubits – far from CRQC.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n Only partially. Grover’s algorithm halves the effective key length of symmetric methods. AES-256 is reduced to AES-128 level with quantum computers – still secure. AES-128 is reduced to 64-bit security level – critically important in the long term. Recommendation: Use AES-256.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n Crypto-agility is the ability to quickly exchange cryptographic algorithms in a system without redeveloping the overall architecture. It is the opposite of “algorithm hardcoding.” Crypto-agile systems can respond to new threats or new standards without complete redevelopment.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n Not immediately, but start now. Immediate action required: Create crypto inventory, develop PQC roadmap, identify long-lasting secrets. Begin technical migration in 2-3 years when products offer PQC support. Aim for complete migration by 2030.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n The BSI (Federal Office for Information Security) has published extensive technical guidelines on post-quantum cryptography (TR-02102). These provide clear recommendations on algorithms, key lengths, and migration paths. Available for free at bsi.bund.de.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n \u2192 CNAPP and CSPM 2025: Building Cloud-Native Security Correctly<\/p>\n \u2192 Zero Trust for SMEs<\/a><\/p>\n Technology Innovations: cloudmagazin.com<\/a><\/p>\n Future Technologies: mybusinessfuture.com<\/a><\/p>\n More from the MBF Media Network<\/p>\nTL;DR<\/h2>\n
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Why the Threat is Real – Even Without Today’s Quantum Computers<\/h2>\n
NIST Post-Quantum Standards: What Applies Now<\/h2>\n
What Companies Can Do Now<\/h2>\n
Key Facts at a Glance<\/h2>\n
Frequently Asked Questions<\/h2>\n
What does “Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer” (CRQC) mean?<\/strong><\/summary>\n
Is AES threatened by quantum computers?<\/strong><\/summary>\n
What is crypto-agility?<\/strong><\/summary>\n
Do we need to migrate immediately?<\/strong><\/summary>\n
Which German authorities provide guidance on PQC?<\/strong><\/summary>\n
Further Articles on the Topic<\/h2>\n
Further Reading in the Network<\/h2>\n
Related Articles<\/h2>\n
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